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Abstract 
This paper considers the effects of government policies when processed food markets are 
imperfectly competitive. Importantly, the effects differ between Bertrand and Cournot 
competition. In particular, although there is incomplete policy transmission to food prices, 
it is greater if firms follow Bertrand rather than Coumot strategies when products are 
differentiated. 
Introduction 
In recent years, agricultural economists have increasingly focussed on the processing and 
distributive industries as an important constituent of the food sector in developed 
economies. This research indicates that these industries tend to be characterized, to varying 
degrees, by oligopolistic market structures, (see for example, Burns et al, 1983, and Connor 
et al, 1985). However, this research has tended to treat these activities in an isolated 
manner, paying only slight attention to any interdependence between horizontal market 
competition and vertical market links. Also, work focussing on the farm-retail spread and 
how it may be affected policy, has assumed competitive markets, thus ignoring a key 
characteristic of the food industries (see for example, Gardner, 1975, and Chambers, 1983). 
The aim of this paper, therefore, is to consider the effects on the food processing 
sector of farm support policies and trade policies that impact on food prices, taking account 
of imperfect competition in food processing. The key proposition of the paper is that the 
effect on food prices of a change in government support, whether domestic or against 
foreign competitors, will depend on the nature of strategic interaction in the processing 
industries, i.e. Cournot versus Bertrand strategies, and the extent of food product 
differentiation. In other words, the effect of vertical linkages between different parts of the 
food chain depends in part on the nature of horizontal strategic interaction. It is also shown 
that the effect of government policies on firms' market shares and revenues will differ 
between Cournot and Bertrand behavior. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 outlines the model; the comparative 
static effects on market shares, revenues and food prices following a change in government 
support are considered in Section 2 and Section 3 draws some conclusions. 
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1. Theoretical Framework 
It is assumed that the relevant processed food market is dominated by two firms, one 
domestic and one foreign. Unprocessed agricultural produce enters the firms' cost functions, 
this produce being derived from their respective domestic agricultural sectors. These firms 
compete with other firms for the farm produce, the latter serving different and segmented 
markets, hence there are no spillover effects from other processed food sectors and the issue 
of monopsony does not arise with respect to the farming sector1• Both firms have constant 
cost schedules. In this framework, government policy can take either of two forms: 
domestic agricultural policy aimed at giving farmers higher prices which affects the home 
firm's costs ( c1); restrictions on imports of the processed good, which affects the foreign 
firm's costs (c2) 2• Other sectors of the economy can be regarded as a competitive numeraire 
so that the consumer's utility function is linear and separable in the numeraire. Thus income 
effects can be ignored and partial equilibrium analysis can be conducted. 
(1) 
The representative consumer maximizes: 
2 
U(qpqz) - E piqt 
i-1 
where qi and Pi are. the amount and price of each good and U(q1,qz) is given by: 
(2) 
where (2) is quadratic and concave, ai and bi are assumed positive; and subscript 1 (2) refers 
to the domestic (foreign) good. Maximizing e>.'Pression (1) generates the following inverse 
demand functions: 
1 In order to avoid the problem of bilateral oligopoly, the distributive sector is assumed to be competitive. 
2 Trade policies can also be thought of as foreign farm support policies insofar as they have a similar effect. 
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(3) 
(4) 
where b1b2 - k2 > 0 if the products are imperfect substitutes, b1b2 - k2 = 0 if they are 
perfectly substitutable and k = 0 if they are independent. 
The direct demand functions can be written as: 
(5) 
(6) 
where the parameters are defined as follows: 
«1 -
a1b2 - k0i 
«2 -
a2b1 - ka1 
b1b2 - k2 blb2 - k2 (7) 
P1 -
b2 
P2 -
bl k 
blb2 - k2 bl b2 - k2 
; y -
b1b2 - k2 
As above, if {31{32 - y2 > 0, products are imperfectly substitutable, {31{32 - y2 = 0 if they are 
perfectly substitutable and y = 0 if they are independent. 
Since the focus of this paper is on analyzing the outcome of government policies 
when firms play either Cournot (quantity-setting) or Bertrand strategies (price-setting), it 
is necessary to establish the initial Nash equilibria. 
(a) Coumot Equilibrium 
In a Cournot game, each processing firm chooses quantity in order to maximize profits, 
assuming the output of its competitor is given. Focussing on the domestic firm (firm 1), it 
maximizes profits 7r 1 as given by: 
(8) 
4 
(9) d1t1 
- - a - 2b q - kq - c - 0 dql 1 1 I 2 1 
and thus: 
(10) 
where (10) is firm l's reaction function, which is downward-sloping with slope of -k/2b1• 
Similarly, the foreign firm's (firm 2) reaction function is given as: 
(11) 
which is also downward-sloping with slope of -k/2b2• Assuming the usual stability conditions 
for these functions (see Tirole, 1989), there will be a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in 
quantities, the explicit expressions being: 
(12) 
(13) 
the Cournot equilibrium prices are: 
(14) 
(15) 
(b) Bertrand Equilibrium 
In a Bertrand game, each firm chooses price to maximize profits assuming the price of its 
rival is given. Again, focussing on the domestic firm, it maximizes 'ff 1 as given by: 
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(16) 
(17) 
and thus: 
(18) 
This is firm l's reaction function in price which is upward-sloping with slope of y /2/31• 
Similarly for firm 2: 
(19) 
which is also upward-sloping with slope of y /2/32• Assuming stability of the reaction 
functions, the explicit Bertrand-Nash price and quantity equilibria can be written as: 
(20) B 2132<a1 + C1l31) + ya2 + C2l32Y P1 - ----------
4131 l32 - Y2 
(21) 
(22) B 2131[y(a2 + l32c2) - l32<a1 + C113,)] Y2 ( a 1 + cl 131) - Y ( 131 <X2 + 131 C2 l32) ql - al + + 
4131132 - Y2 4131132 - Y2 
(23) B 2132[y(a1 + l31c1) - l31<a2 + c2l32)l Y2(a2 + c2l3 2) - y(cx1132 + l32c1131) q2 + a2 + + 
4131132 - Y2 413,132 - Y2 
As shown by Singh and Vives (1984) and Cheng (1985), Cournot equilibrium quantities 
(prices) will be lower (higher) than Bertrand equilibrium quantities (prices). Firms' profits 
are also greater under Cournot compared to Bertrand. The remainder of this paper is 
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concerned with the effects of relative changes in prices and quantities following changes in 
government intervention given, firms pursue either Cournot or Bertrand strategies. 
2. The Effects of Government Intenrention 
(a) Domestic Agricultural Policy 
It is assumed that governments use price support policies as the main instrument in the 
agricultural sector. Since farm produce enters the cost function of the domestic firm, this 
policy will influence the competitiveness of the domestic processing firm when competing 
with the foreign firm. The effect on market share, processed food prices and firms' revenues 
are now outlined. 
Focussing first on the Cournot case, the effect of increasing c1 on firm 1 and 2's 
output is seen by differentiating (12) and (13) with respect to c1: 
(24) 
c 
- 2b2 dq. 
dc1 4blb2-k2 
c dq2 k 
dc1 4blb2 - k2 
(25) 
Clearly, following an increase in domestic agricultural support, the domestic firm loses 
market share, while the foreign firm increases its share of the market. 
The effect on prices is obtained by differentiating (14) and (15) with respect to c1: 
(26) 
c 2blb2-k2 dpl 1 
dc1 4bl b2 - k2 2 
c b2k dpz 
< 1 
dc1 4blb2 - k2 
(27) 
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Both domestic and foreign firms' prices rise, which suggests that the cut-back in the 
domestic firm's output is not offset by an increase in that of the foreign firm. This is as 
expected given the stability conditions for the reaction functions. Importantly, policy price 
increases are not fully transmitted to increased food prices. Expression (26), indicates that 
the domestic firm only passes on half of the cost increase to consumers The outcome is 
less clear for the foreign firm, although the cost increase is passed on less than fully (it will 
be less than a half if either b2 or k is less than a halt). The intuition for this result is the 
competitive discipline of the foreign firm on the domestic firm as the former moves down 
its reaction function, given the cut-back in output by the latter. 
The change in revenue for the domestic and foreign firms is given by: 
(28) dRc -bz 1 
--dc1 4blb2 - k2 
dRzc b2k 
--dc1 (4b1b2 - k2)2 
(29) 
which follows from (24 )-(27). Clearly, revenues decline (increase) for the domestic (foreign) 
processing firm. 
A similar exercise in comparative statics can be carried out for the case of Bertrand 
behavior. The effect on market share of an increase in domestic farm support is given by 
differentiating (22) and (23) with respect to c1: 
(30) 
B -2P~P2 + Y2P1 dql 
dc1 4P1 P2 - Y2 
B 
P1P2Y dq2 
dc1 4P1 P2 - Y2 
(31) 
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As in the case of Coumot, the home firm's output and hence market share declines while 
that of the foreign firm increases. 
The change in processed food prices is given by differentiating (20) and (21) with 
(32) 
B 
P2P1 dpl 
dc1 2P1P2 - Y2 
dp: Y P1 
dc1 4 P1 P2 - Y2 
(33) 
Both prices increase, the increase in p~ being greater than p~ if the goods are imperfect 
substitutes. Again, policy price transmission is less than complete, though pass-through is 
greater the more substitutable the products. Finally, with respect to firms' revenue: 
dRB 2 1 -Pi P2 
---dc1 4131 P2 - v2 
(34) 
(35) dRi_B P2P~Y2 
-- -dc1 (4 P1 P2 - v2>2 
which follows from (30)-(33). The domestic firm's revenue falls and that of the foreign firm 
increases. 
From the above analysis, the Coumot and Bertrand outcomes can be compared. 
Proposition 1: Following an increase in domestic farm support, (a) for sufficiently low values 
of the demand parameters, the domestic firm will lose a bigger share of the market if 
playing Coumot compared to Bertrand, (b) for sufficiently low values of the demand 
parameters, the foreign firm's increased share of the market will be relatively smaller under 
Bertrand than Coumot strategies, (c) if products are imperfect substitutes, domestic price 
transmission is greater under Bertrand than Cournot, (d) there is no difference in changes 
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in the foreign firm's prices with the two alternative strategies and (e) the loss in home firm's 
revenue is lower under Bertrand than Coumot and, for sufficiently low values of the demand 
parameters, the revenue gain for the foreign firm is less under Bertrand than Coumot. 
Proof: Proposition l(a) can be shown by substituting (7) into (30) and comparing with (24): 
(36) dqlB 2b1 b2 + k2 
dqic dc1 2 
which will be less than 1 if b1 and b2 are sufficiently small, if not, the result is reversed. 
Proposition l(b) is illustrated by substituting (7) into (31) and comparing with (25): 
(37) 
which is less than 1 for sufficiently low values of b1 and b2• If this does not hold, the result 
is reversed. 
Proposition 1 (c) is shown by substituting (7) into (32) and comparing with (26): 
(38) 
Hence, if the processed foods are imperfect substitutes, policy price transmission is greater 
with Bertrand than Cournot strategies. 
Proposition l(d) is proved by substituting (7) into (33) and comparing with (27): 
(39) 
B dp2 
Finally, Proposition 1 (e) is established by comparing (34) and (35) following, the 
appropriate substitution from (7) and comparing with (28) and (29) respectively: 
dR 8 1 
c - b1b2 
dR1 de 
I 
(40) 
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(41) 
( 40) will be less than 1, with b1 and/ or b2 less than 1, suggesting that the loss in revenue for 
the. domestic firm is lower for Bertrand than Cournot behavior, while for the foreign firm, 
( 41) suggests that the revenue gain for the foreign firm will be less under Bertrand than 
Coumot behavior. 
(b) Trade Policy 
This section considers the effects of tariffs imposed on imports of the processed food, there 
being no trade in raw agricultural produce. An alternative way of interpreting the following 
results is to consider the effects of the foreign government raising its domestic farm support 
price. Given the nature of the model, the results presented are largely symmetric to those 
already reported, hence for convenience, only the final results are presented. 
Proposition 2: If the government imposes a tariff on imports of processed food, (a) 
for sufficiently high values of the inverse demand parameters, the increase in market share 
for the home firm is greater under Bertrand than Cournot, (b) for sufficiently high values 
of the inverse demand parameters, the loss in market share for the foreign firm is greater 
under Bertrand than Cournot, (c) there is no difference between the Bertrand and Cournot 
strategies with respect to the effect on domestic food prices, (d) if products are 
differentiated, the transmission of tariffs to final prices is greater under Bertrand than 
Cournot and (e) for sufficiently high values of b1 and/or b2, the home (foreign) firm's 
revenue gain (loss) is greater under Bertrand than Cournot. 
Proof: By differentiating the relevant expressions for prices and quantities with respect to 
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c2, substituting in from (7) and comparing the Cournot and Bertrand cases; 
Proposition 2(a): 
(42) 
For sufficiently high values of b1 and b2, ( 42) will be greater than 1. 
Proposition 2 (b): 
(43) dq: 2b1 b2 - k2 
dq{ dcz 2 
which will be greater than 1 for sufficiently high values of b1 and b2• 
Proposition 2(c): 
(44) 
- 1 
i.e. the effects of tariffs on prices are the same for Cournot and Bertrand strategies. 
Proposition 2(d): 
(45) 
For differentiated products, policy pnce transmission 1s greater under Bertrand than 
Cournot. 
Proposition 2(e): is determined from the results for prices and quantities: 
(46) 
(47) dR: 2b1b2 (2b1b2 - k2) 
dRzc de 4bl b2 - k2 
2 
' • 
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3. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper has considered the effect of government policies that either directly affect the 
domestic farm sector or affect the flow of processed food imports to the domestic market, 
explicitly accounting for strategic interaction between domestic and foreign processing firms. 
It has been shown that government policy has different effects on firms' market shares and 
revenues and food prices depending on whether firms play Cournot or Bertrand. The 
structure of the market has also been shown to be important insofar as it is reflected in the 
parameters of the demand system and the extent of product differentiation. ·A key result 
of the paper is that policy price transmission is incomplete in both the Bertrand and 
Coumot cases, though it is likely to be greater in the former than the latter. The intuition 
for such incomplete transmission is that the policy acts as a restraint on the firm directly 
affected, given the firms are acting non-cooperatively. 
Some cautionary remarks should be made at this point. Following the maxim that 
results from oligopoly theory can be solely a function of the initial assumptions (Bulow et 
al, 1985), it is worth noting that the results reported here may be specific to the linearity of 
the demand system. That being so, such comparative statics exercises ought to be conducted 
with alternative functional forms, the advantage of linearity being simplicity. Further, only 
two forms of strategic interaction have been considered; other forms of oligopolistic 
behavior as well as more specific policy actions (e.g. deficiency payments, quotas etc.) are 
also worthy of consideration in future research. 
' • 
References 
Bulow, J.I., Geankoplos, J.D. and Klemperer, P.D. (1985) "Multimarket Oligopoly: 
Strategic Substitutes and Complements", Journal of Political Economy. 23., 488-511. 
Burns, J., Mclnerney, J. and Swinbank, A (1983) The Food Industry: Economics and 
Policies, Heinemann: London. 
Chambers, R.G. (1983) "International Trade, Gross Substitutability and the Domestic 
Farm-Retail Margin", European Review of Agricultural Economics, 1Q, 33-53. 
Cheng, L (1985) "Comparing Bertrand and Coumot Equilibria: A Geometric Approach", 
Rand Journal of Economics, 1.Q, 146-152. 
Connor, J.M., Rogers, R.T., Marion, B.W., Mueller, W.F. (1985) The Food Manufacturing 
Industries, Lexington: Mass. 
Gardner, B.L (1975) "The Farm-Retail Price Spread in a Competitive Food Industry", 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 57, 399-409. 
Singh, N. and Vives, X. (1984) "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated 
Duopoly", Rand Journal of Economics, Ji 546-551. 
Tirole, J. The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press: Mass. 
